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THE END OF JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISATION?
Jo Hunt∗
Summary: Conventional academic discourse, within both law and po-
litical science tells the story of how the European Court of Justice, 
though its judgments and judicial practices has ‘constitutionalised’ 
the EC Treaty, reformatting an intergovernmental bargain into a feder-
al legal order. Many accounts have presented the Court as the heroic 
champion of integration, pushing the integrationist agenda forward 
when political channels are blocked, and integration through politi-
cal and legislative means stalled. This article considers whether, in 
the period following the rejection of the formal constitutionalisation 
project, it is appropriate to look to the Court to step in and continue 
the drive towards further, deeper integration, and to further develop 
and entrench its own constitutional role. It is argued that such a view 
should not be too readily accepted, as it could be seen as affording too 
great a respect for the rhetoric of judicial constitutionalisation, which 
is presented as both fallacious and unhelpful, and as affording insuf-
fi cient recognition of the realities of the Court’s role as a legal institu-
tional actor operating within a complex context in which it has limited 
autonomy. The paper reviews existing academic assessments of the 
constitutionalising role of the Court, before considering the signifi -
cance of the recently proposed Treaty changes to the role and position 
of the Court, which leads to a consideration of the limited prospects for 
continued judicial ‘constitutionalisation’ in the future.
Introduction
Conventional academic discourse, within both law and political sci-
ence tells the story of how the European Court of Justice, though its 
judgments and judicial practices has ‘constitutionalised’ the EC Treaty, 
reformatting an intergovernmental bargain into a federal legal order. This 
rhetoric of constitutionalisation has itself been long used by the Court. 
Within academic accounts, emphasis has also been placed on the con-
stitutional adjudicatory role the Court plays amongst the other functions 
it performs, and indeed, there have been calls for reform of the judicial 
architecture so as to assign it a purely constitutional role. Additionally, 
conventional accounts have presented the Court as the heroic champion 
of integration, pushing the integrationist agenda forward when political 
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channels are blocked, and integration through political and legislative 
means stalled. On one level then, in the period following the rejection of 
the formal constitutionalisation project, it is perhaps not inappropriate 
to look to the Court to step in and continue the drive towards further, 
deeper integration, and to further develop and entrench its own consti-
tutional role. However, it is argued that such a view should not be too 
readily accepted, as it could be seen as affording too great a respect for 
the rhetoric of judicial constitutionalisation, and insuffi cient recognition 
of the realities of the Court’s role as a legal institutional actor operating 
within a complex context in which it has limited autonomy. 
1: Constitutionalisation by the Court
All students of EU law are steeped in the canon of familiar cases 
which are strung together in a legal narrative which tells the story of the 
Court of Justice’s constitutionalisation of the Treaty. 
Starting with Van Gend en Loos1 and Costa v Enel,2 it tells how the 
Court, through its judicial pronouncements, created a set of principles 
which structure the EU legal order. Through these early, crucial inter-
ventions, the Court recognised the possibility of direct effect of Com-
munity law, thereby creating a framework in which rights derived from 
Community law could, under certain circumstances, be relied on directly 
before national courts. Further, these Community law rights are to be 
regarded as supreme, thereby trumping confl icting national law, of what-
ever status. The Court subsequently developed a set of legal principles 
on the operation and effectiveness of remedies for the breach of EC law 
at national level, going so far as to construct a right to damages for in-
dividuals in the event of a suffi ciently serious breach of EC law by the 
Member States.3 Additionally, the Court was to expand on the review of 
legality of Community acts with which it was charged under Article 230 
EC Treaty, identifying a set of overarching ‘general principles’, including 
fundamental human rights, which could operate as legally enforceable 
constraints on the exercise of power by the EC institutions, and also by 
the Member States in the context of their application of EC law. In this 
way, it developed itself a role as a court of constitutional review, famously 
proclaiming that the EC ‘is a Community based on the rule of law, in as 
much as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review 
of the question of whether the measures adopted by them are in conform-
1  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 
1.
2  Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585.
3  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR 
I-5357.
137CYELP 3 [2007] 135-155
ity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.4 Added to this has 
been the Court’s role in determining the extent of the EC’s internal and 
external competences, fi xing the outer limits of the legitimate exercise of 
the EC’s attributed powers.
The Court then may be seen as having been a motor of integration, 
driving the Community ever onward towards further and deeper integra-
tion. The steady accretion of constitutionalising case law over the years 
may be presented as the inevitable achievement of the ‘certaine idée de 
l’Europe’5 coded into its legal system, and as according with some blue 
print to which the Court is tirelessly working. However, such an account 
has been demonstrated as being based on assumptions about the Court 
and the law which are fallacious, and unhelpful. Such assumptions, it will 
be shown in this section, are fallacious, as they overstate the integrative 
capacity of law, and posit a view of the case law as progressing inelucta-
bly to an inevitable constitutional fi nalité. They are also unhelpful, in that 
the rhetoric of constitutionalisation ascribed to the Court’s activities was 
taken as the starting point in the negotiations and drafting work which 
lead to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for the European Union, a 
process which revealed the judicial constitution to be out of step, and ir-
reconcilable with social and political reality. This point will be considered 
in section 2. The constitutional signifi cance for the Court of the Reform 
Treaty mandate is examined in section 3, before a consideration of the 
future of judicial constitutionalisation is provided in section 4. 
That caution should be exercised in accepting the simplifi ed consti-
tutional narrative was a point raised over two decades ago by Shapiro. He 
launched a critique on conventional lawyerly accounts of constitutionali-
sation by the Court as being ‘constitutional law without politics’ which
presents the Community as a juristic idea; the written constitution 
as a sacred text; the professional commentary as a legal truth; the 
case law as the inevitable working out of the correct implications of 
the constitutional text; and the constitutional court as the disem-
bodied voice of right reason and constitutional teleology.6 
Picking up this critique, Shaw challenged the assumption under-
pinning many accounts of the Court which posits ‘an immutable link 
between law and legal processes and integration’, where the latter ‘is con-
ventionally if somewhat simplistically understood as a process leading 
4  Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, 1365.
5  The term used by a former judge of the European Court of Justice, P Pescatore, ‘The Doc-
trine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 EL Rev 155, 157.
6  M Shapiro, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Politics’ (1979-80) 53 Southern California 
Law Review 537, 538.
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towards greater centralisation of governmental functions’.7 Shaw asserts 
that ‘the role of law and of the Court in feeding integration processes is 
taken for granted, and frequently overstated’,8 whilst the true picture is 
signifi cantly more complex. Wincott similarly, critiques the ‘inevitability 
of the constitutionalisation of Community law’ apparent in some doctri-
nal accounts, which writes out politics and agency, and assumes a ‘linear 
progression towards ever closer union’.9 Clearly, Shaw and Wincott are 
not denying that the Court has handed down judgments of constitutional 
signifi cance, but they highlight that attempts to present this as an in-
evitable, inexorable move towards further integration would be wrong. 
And an easy reliance on the court as a constitutional champion is mis-
placed.
A major corrective to conventional constitutional accounts has been 
in the growth of work which focuses on the environment in which Court 
operates, on its interlocutors,10 and, importantly, on their interrelation-
ships. Wincott for example, attacks approaches which ‘assume that the 
statement of a legal principle by the Court is tantamount to the consti-
tution of a new legal reality, rather than understanding it as part of a 
policy making process’11 and further demonstrates that the Court has 
by no means been in full control of the environment in which it oper-
ates.12 Similarly, Armstrong’s approach refl ects an understanding that 
the Court’s jurisprudence ‘should not be conceived of in terms of fi delity 
to a foundational Member State bargain, nor to a preordained teleology 
of integration, but rather to an attempt to mediate between law and its 
environment’.13 In this environment, the Court’s identity as a judicial in-
stitution is paramount : to ensure its legitimacy qua judicial authority, it 
has to be seen to be operating according to legal processes and norms of 
appropriateness. The Court’s rulings have to fulfi l certain basic require-
ments so as to satisfy the demands of ‘internal’, or legal legitimacy,14 
7  J Shaw, ‘Introduction’ in J Shaw and G More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European 
Union (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 3. 
8  Ibid 4.
9  D Wincott, ‘Political Theory, Law and European Union’ in Shaw and More (n 7) 298.
10  JHH Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors’ 
(1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 510.
11  Ibid 299.
12  D Wincott, ‘The Role of Law or the Rule of the Court of Justice? An ‘Institutional’ Ac-
count of Judicial Politics in the European Community’ (1995) 2 Journal of European Public 
Policy 583. 
13  KA Armstrong, ‘Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European Integra-
tion’ (1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 155, 156. 
14  See further J Bengoetxea, N MacCormick and L Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity 
in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler 
(eds), The European Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford 2001). 
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which would include the sources used by it in reaching its judgment, 
and the nature of its reasoning processes. The Court’s immediate legal 
institutional environment is to be seen as limiting and structuring: ‘[I]t 
structures access to the courts and the formalities of appearing before 
the ECJ. It structures the substantive forms of argument which can be 
raised and the procedures for doing so. It structures the normative con-
struction of facts presented to the ECJ’.15 An account of the Court’s case 
law which is more in line with the identity of the Court as a judicial insti-
tution, operating according to judicial norms is provided by former Judge 
at the Court, David Edward: ‘[T]he judge must proceed from one case to 
another, seeking, as points come up for decision, to make the legal sys-
tem consistent, coherent, workable and effective’.16 
A judgment which is internally justifi able according to legal norms 
will not necessarily be externally justifi able, that is, be considered ethi-
cally, politically or ideologically acceptable17 by other actors. That is not 
to say that the Court operates in an apolitical vacuum, of course. Ex-
ternal forces may well prove important, but these have to be fed into, 
and responded to, within the context of the Court operating as a legal 
institution. The Court operates within a dense network of policy actors, 
including referring courts, national supreme and constitutional courts, 
the Commission, Advocates General, Member States governments and 
litigants. Some of these actors have a particularly privileged place in the 
Court’s institutional structure, enabling them ready access to participate 
in cases, presenting the Court with their own perspectives on the ‘correct’ 
response in particular case, and feeding into an ongoing, iterative proc-
ess of policy, and polity development. Important recent work has seen 
attention turn to assessments of the contributions made to the direction 
of the Court’s case law by the submissions of Advocates General,18 as 
well as of the Member State governments, through the observations made 
before the Court,19 in a range of policy sectors. However, it is perhaps 
signifi cant and refl ective of the continued dominance of the autonomous, 
heroic view of the Court to note how little attention lawyers have placed 
on the important interchanges which have taken place between Commis-
sion and Court20 since Stein identifi ed the former’s apparent contribution 
15  KA Armstrong, ‘Conceptualizing the European Union: The Contribution of New Institu-
tionalism’ (1998) (unpublished paper, on fi le with the author).
16  D Edward, ‘Judicial Activism: Myth or Reality?’ in AIL Campbell and M Voyatzi (eds), Le-
gal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law (Trenton, Gosport 1996) 66-7. 
17  Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano (n 14) 61.
18  N Burrows and R Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law (OUP, Oxford 2007).
19  M-P Granger, ‘When Governments Go To Luxembourg: The Infl uence of Governments on 
the European Court of Justice’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 1. Review 1
20  But see, in the fi eld of the free movement of goods, K Alter and S Meunier-Aitsahalia, 
‘Judicial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the Path-break-
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in 1981.21 Reviewing the then extant corpus of constitutionalising cases, 
Stein demonstrated that in all but two of the eleven cases, the Court’s 
judgments accorded with the views presented by the legal service of the 
Commission. Indeed, it was the Commission which had introduced to 
the Court in Van Gend the idea of the Community system as a new le-
gal order, and had argued strongly for the recognition of direct effect of 
Community law provisions. In fact, the Court stopped short of the Com-
mission’s position in this case, which sought acknowledgement of the 
supremacy principle, though of course this was later to come in Costa. 
Stein views the Court as having been ‘led’ by the Commission, their close 
alliance ‘probably alleviat[ing] some of the concern members of the Court 
may have felt regarding the legitimacy and acceptance of its rulings’.22 
All this should not be taken as assuming that the Court is in some way 
captured by the political actors in the fi eld, it is not the agent to their 
principal, simply, it will be aware of its political environment, of what is 
presented as politically appropriate, and may seek to incorporate such 
views when exercising its judicial functions. 
Just as there were particular views held by the members of the Legal 
Services of the Commission, it is of course relevant to consider the views 
held and approaches taken by the members of the Court at a particu-
lar time. Sometimes these may well coalesce around une certain idée de 
l’Europe which is shared by certain other political actors. Certain views 
may be deeply embedded in the system, such as the attainment of ef-
fectiveness and coherence in the legal order, whilst others may be more 
policy specifi c, refl ecting particular political and economic ideologies. 
Such principles and values could include for example, the achievement 
of the goal of market integration, fair competition, and respect for family 
life.23 However, such principles should not necessarily be seen as stat-
ic, or all powerful, as they respond to changing values of the time, and 
also to the shifting composition of the Court. The importance of judicial 
backgrounds was averred to by another former Judge of the ECJ, Ulrich 
Everling, who, in the mid 1980s, suggested the Court’s ‘increasingly cau-
ing Cassis de Dijon Decision’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 535; and, in the fi eld 
of employment protection, J Hunt, ‘The Court of Justice as a Policy Actor: The Case of the 
Acquired Rights Directive’ (1998) 18 LS 336.
21  E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 
AJIL 1.
22  Ibid 24.
23  As witnessed in a number of recent citizenship/free movement cases such as Case C-
413/99 Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-
60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279; however, 
the model of the family being protected is a particularly traditional one, cf the treatment of 
gay partnership rights: Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621; Joined 
Cases C-122/99 P and C 125/99 P D and Sweden v Council [2001] ECR I-4319.
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tious’ approach to laying down general principles was in part due to ‘the 
arrival of judges from the common law tradition schooled in case law and 
inclined to a pragmatic approach’.24 
A further corrective offered by Shaw to the conventional constitu-
tionalisation approach was her recognition of disintegration in the EU 
legal order, the counterpoint to increasing centralisation, apparent, for 
example, in the fragmented pillars of the Union, and, within the EC pil-
lar, in the space for difference and diversity refl ected in the norms, tools 
and techniques of the law. These include the principle of subsidiarity, but 
also in longer standing elements, such as the space afforded for national 
variation by directives. Such elements are presented ‘not as exceptions 
to an integrationist norm, but as autonomous facets of the whole’.25 Ten 
years on from Shaw’s contribution, the disintegrative elements in the 
EU order are more pronounced, or at least, more acknowledged by legal 
commentators, disintegration becoming normalised, as accounts of the 
Court and the legal order mature. Extensive work for example has been 
undertaken examining the open method of co-ordination as a governance 
technique,26 as an alternative to legal regulation, and incorporating it into 
our models of the EU legal order, though of course, steering through soft 
law is by no means new phenomenon.27 The assumption that the Court 
seeks ‘to expand the scope of supranational governance’ whilst claimed 
by Stone Sweet to be ‘implicitly shared by nearly all legal scholars’28 is 
increasingly untenable, as seen by the cases in which it has resisted 
centralising tendencies.29 Nor, it should be noted, has the Court pursued 
all lines so as to reinforce its own constitutional role. It famously has 
chosen not to facilitate the route to the Court for direct challenges to the 
legality of Community measures for ‘non-privileged’ actors under Article 
230 EC Treaty. As Schepel and Blankenburg point out, it has ‘refrained 
from turning Article [230] into a vehicle of general constitutional review’. 
Further, 
24  U Everling, ‘The Court of Justice as a Decision-making Authority’ (1983-4) 82 Michigan 
Law Review 1294, 1301. 
25  J Shaw, ‘European Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’ (1996) 16 OJLS 
232, 241 (emphasis in the original).
26  See, for example, J Scott and D Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1 (introduction to a 
special edition on new governance); G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance 
in the EU and US (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006).
27  K Wellens and G Borchardt, ‘Soft Law in the European Community Law’ (1989) 14 EL 
Rev 267. 
28  A Stone Sweet, ‘European Integration and the Legal System’ in T Börzel and R Ci-
chowski (eds) The State of the European Union, Volume 6: Law Politics and Society (OUP, 
Oxford 2003) 25.
29  See Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; Case C-376/98 Germany v 
Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419.
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[a] court that wants to engage in lawmaking usually transforms its 
courtroom into a legislative assembly - allowing class actions, pub-
lic interest litigation, popular constitutional complaints, Brandeis 
briefs. The most striking feature of the ECJ’s case law is that it has 
resisted all of these.30 
In short, ‘constitutionalisation’ may be a consequence of the activi-
ties of the Court, a useful label ascribed to the various judgments which 
have had a structuring impact on the nature of the EU legal order, but 
constitutionalisation should not be seen as some inherent logic within 
the legal system, driving the Court - and the integration process - ever 
forward. 
2: The Court under the Constitutional Treaty
The conventional rhetoric of judicial constitutionalism - and the 
strength of the Court- created constitution was to be tested by the at-
tempts to formalise certain key aspects under the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Constitutional Treaty would also affect in a number of competing 
ways the Court’s role and status as the supreme and constitutional court 
for the EU. However, compared to the political institutions, the Court 
received very limited attention in the process of drafting and adopting 
the Constitutional Treaty. It was not directly represented in the Conven-
tion framework, none of the Working Groups focused exclusively on the 
Court and its future role, though certain of the Court’s members were 
involved (in a personal capacity) in presenting evidence to the Working 
Groups which fed into the draft Treaty presented by the Convention to 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Somewhat belatedly, and in response 
to concerns raised in the Convention’s plenary discussion about the lim-
ited attention paid to the Court, a ‘Discussion Circle’ on the Court was es-
tablished. The Circle was given a very limited period in which it meet and 
present its report,31 and, with the odd exception, the suggested areas for 
its attention were of relatively limited constitutional signifi cance. These 
issues included possible changes to the procedure for appointing the 
Judges and Advocates-General; changes to the decision rules for amend-
ments to the Court’s rules of procedure; consideration of the names of 
the Courts; the fi ning power of the Court of Justice where states fail to 
comply with its judgment; and of greater constitutional signifi cance, the 
standing rules for individual applicants to bring actions in judicial review 
before the Courts. 
30  H Schepel and E Blankenburg, ‘Mobilizing the European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca 
and Weiler (n 14) 41.
31  It met on four occasions in February and March 2003 before presenting its main report, 
CONV 636/03, on 25 March 2003.
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The creation of the Constitutional Treaty necessarily involved at-
tempts to formalise and concretise certain constitutional doctrines which 
formerly existed solely in the Court’s jurisprudence (and ‘received’ with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm and consistency by the national courts), 
and which had never, as such, been held up to a binary accept/reject 
determination on the part of Member State governments. It is in relation 
to the principle of primacy, or supremacy, where we see the most glaring 
mismatch between the conventional rhetoric of judicial constitutionalism 
clashing with other legal and political realities. A privileging of the Court 
of Justice’s jurisprudence presents Community law supremacy as an es-
sential, fundamental and unconditional aspect of the legal order. The 
Court of Justice of course ruled in Internationale Hangelsgesellschaft32 
that provisions of Community law held supremacy over national con-
stitutional provisions. A majority of Member States however would not 
share this view. Their courts’ understandings of supremacy are condi-
tional, and the Court of Justice’s rulings are refracted through their own 
national constitutional lenses.33 Some indeed have had the opportunity 
to make explicit their rejection of EC law supremacy over their constitu-
tions.34 According to the conventional constitutional rhetoric however, 
such positions by Member State courts are regarded as temporary aber-
rations, with the expectation that they will eventually fall into line. Weiler 
for example spoke of the ‘evolutionary character’ of the process of the in-
corporation of the principle by the national supreme courts.35 What such 
views fail to capture is that the conditionality attached to supremacy is 
not a temporary aberration, but a permanent feature of the EU constitu-
tional order. The drafting history of the supremacy clause is instructive 
- with the fi rst drafts of the article providing that the law of the EU con-
stitution would be supreme over the law and constitutions of the Member 
States. The fi nal text, contained in Article I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty, 
meanwhile provided that ‘the Constitution and law adopted by the insti-
tutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have 
primacy over the law of the Member States’. Despite a statement annexed 
32  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125.
33  On the French Constitutional Court’s decision on the constitutionality of possible ratifi -
cation of the Constitutional Treaty, see L Azoulai and FR Agerbeek, ‘Conseil constitutionnel 
(French Constitutional Court), Decision No. 2004-505 DC of 19 November 2004, on the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 871. See also, of course, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court’s contribution to the issue, eg Re Wünsche Han-
delsgesellsschaft [1987] CMLR 225 and Brunner v The EU Treaty [1994] CMLR 57.
34  See the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on Poland’s Membership in the EU 
(The Accession Treaty), K18/04, 11 May 2005 <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summa-
ries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf> accessed 22 July 2007.
35  JHH Weiler, ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 
1 YBEL 267, 276.
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to the Constitutional Treaty that the provision was simply a codifi cation 
of existing case law, its absence certainly allowed for an ambiguity not 
provided for in the Court’s own jurisprudence. 
Of course, that ambiguities over the scope of the supremacy princi-
ple were present in the negotiated Treaty outcome is unsurprising. The 
Court’s version of supremacy is only one version of this story, told for 
particular purposes. Whilst this version has tended to be privileged and 
reifi ed in EU law writing, it simply does not capture the complexity, the 
mixed ‘in between-ness’ of the EU constitutional order. An alternative 
version is gaining ascendancy in academic writing which draws on the 
idea of constitutional pluralism, presenting the relationships between the 
EU and national orders as ‘pluralistic rather than monistic, and interac-
tive rather than hierarchical’.36 Fixing a matter such as the primacy of 
EU law over national constitutional provisions defi nitively, and uncondi-
tionally in a constitution would, according to Shaw, ‘require something 
akin to a constitutional revolution in Europe and in the Member States’.37 
Rather than taking the constitutionally impossible step of concretising 
the position of the Court and its legal order, removing the indeterminacy 
of the system, and establishing defi nitively the status of the Court and 
the effects of its rulings, the settlement reached in the Constitutional 
Treaty left these issues open and indeterminate, rejecting the maximalist 
view of the Court’s constitution. 
As well as containing a denial of the Court’s conception of supremacy, 
the Constitutional Treaty also rejects the view that the Court unequivo-
cally holds kompetenz-kompetenz: the competence to determine the limits 
of EU competence. The concern, refl ected in the German constitutional 
court’s challenge in Brunner38 is that in exercising its review powers, the 
Court of Justice may countenance an extension to the Community’s pow-
ers as set out in the Treaty. Such an extension could only be validated 
by the Member States, as it is they who remain, according to the German 
constitutional court, the ‘Masters of the Treaty’. Under the Constitutional 
Treaty, the exercise of the Union’s competences was to continue to be 
subject to the operation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportion-
ality, with an obvious emphasis on preferring greater ex ante monitoring 
of its operation (through for example, the new role provided for national 
parliaments) over ex post legal action. The attempted demarcation of the 
nature and scope of competences in the Constitutional Treaty could not 
however be expected to reduce the incidence of actions alleging a trans-
36  N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (OUP, Oxford 1999) 118. See also N Walker, ‘The 
Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317.
37  J Shaw, ‘Legal and Political Sources of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ 
(2004) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 214, 237. 
38  See n 33.
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gression of the limits of competence, nor would it have made it any easier 
for the Court to resolve. Any extension to explicitly conferred competenc-
es by the Court appears ruled out by Article I-11 Constitutional Treaty, 
which provides that competences not explicitly conferred on the EU by 
the Constitutional Treaty remain with the Member States. Potential prob-
lems would however arise were the Court required to rule on the very 
question of whether or not competence in a particular case has, or has 
not been handed over, rather than simply assessing whether the exercise 
of power falls within clear cut categories.
However, at the same time as these denials of the conventional con-
stitutional rhetoric, the Constitutional Treaty contained a number of 
aspects that would have contributed to an entrenchment and further 
development of the Court’s role as a Constitutional Court for the EU. 
The fi rst of these is the incorporation in Part II of the Constitutional 
Treaty of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter, adopted 
in a non-binding declaratory form in 2000, would - under the Consti-
tution - have binding force, though certain of its provisions (but by no 
means all) have previously been recognised and enforced by the ECJ as 
part of an overarching set of ‘general principles of law’. Its inclusion may 
be perceived as desirable from the perspective of enhancing legitimacy, 
clarity and transparency within the EU order, and it certainly throws 
into relief the European Court’s constitutional function in ensuring the 
respect of such rights. The Court’s tasks under the Charter would be 
by no means straightforward. The Court would be required to identify 
justiciable ‘rights’ and non-justiciable ‘principles’, and there may be the 
potential for dissonance between the EU’s human rights jurisprudence, 
and that of the ECHR ( recognised under the Constitution as general 
principles of law); and for confusion to arise over the overlap between 
rights expressed in Part II, and those contained elsewhere in the Consti-
tution and in Union law. 
The Constitutional Treaty gave the fundamental rights responsibility 
of the Court an extra dimension with the ‘depillarisation’ of the exist-
ing EU order, and the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction to the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice,39 which incorporates the former EC 
Treaty provisions on visas, asylum and immigration, and the Police and 
Judicial Co-operation pillar. Notably, the standard preliminary reference 
procedure would be available in these areas, rather than the existing sys-
tem which allows States to exclude the opportunity entirely (in respect to 
Police and Judicial Co-operation), or it restrict to the highest courts (in 
39  Though remaining to all intents and purposes excluded from ruling in respect of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, see M-G Ketvel, ‘The Jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 
77.
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respect to the fi eld of visas, asylum and immigration). Bringing these ar-
eas within the general jurisdiction of the ECJ is signifi cant from a consti-
tutional, fundamental rights perspective simply because it is in respect to 
the subject matter of these areas that concerns about fundamental rights 
and freedoms may be considered particularly acute. This is refl ected in 
particular by the revised form of Article 234 EC, which declares that ‘in a 
case pending before a court or tribunal of a member state with regard to 
a person in custody, the Court shall act with a minimum of delay’.40 
Clearly, human rights issues may fi nd their way before the Court 
through preliminary references from national courts. Another route is 
through judicial review, and the direct action for annulment, found in 
the Constitutional Treaty at Article III-365. In a note submitted to the 
Working Group on the Charter/ECHR in September 2002, Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs expressed the view that even if the proposed inclusion of 
the Charter were to go ahead, ‘the fundamental rights so recognised or 
referred to, risk remaining an empty shell if there is no system of judicial 
remedies which guarantees the effective protection of those rights’.41 The 
Advocate General had presented strident calls for a new interpretation of 
the standing rules already, in his judicial capacity, most notably in the 
case of Unión des Pequeños Agricultores.42 In its judgment in that case, 
the Court of Justice confi rmed the existing rules, and failed to endorse 
the Advocate General’s new test, stating that if any change to the standing 
rules were necessary, then change must come from the Member States in 
the context of a Treaty revision, rather than from the Court itself.
 Thus, the issue appeared on the Convention’s agenda. Whilst the 
weight of academic opinion has tended towards favouring a liberalisation 
of the standing rules, particularly in the light of the introduction of the 
Charter so as to facilitate individuals’ access to the Court, it would be a 
mistake to assume that there is unqualifi ed support for this development 
across the EU.43 Member State traditions in relation to judicial review 
are quite different. As one current Judge of the Court, speaking in a per-
sonal capacity observed, whilst challenges to the administrative acts of 
the executive are generally permitted across the Member States, the idea 
of allowing for the annulment of general legislative measures passed in 
accordance with democratic procedures is, according to some legal tradi-
tions, ‘almost revolting’. Article III-365 CT makes some rather tokenistic 
40  Article III-369 Constitutional Treaty.
41  F Jacobs, ‘Note to the Working Group on the Charter/ECHR: Necessary Changes to 
the System of Judicial Remedies’ WG II-WD 20 <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/
wd2/3222.pdf> accessed 22 July 2007.
42  Case C-50/00 P Unión des Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677.
43  M-P Granger, ‘Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals’ (2003) 
66 MLR 124.
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gestures towards a liberalisation of standing, confi rming that in principle 
individuals can challenge any administrative or general legislative meas-
ure, though removing the requirement of individual concern in respect of 
self-executing non-legislative acts. Apart from these minor advances in 
the standing rules under the Constitutional Treaty, the restrictive force of 
the standing rules remained. Perversely, as Craig has noted, the Consti-
tution ‘exhorts the Member States to provide suffi cient legal protection in 
the fi eld of Union law, while saying nothing about any similar obligation 
on the Union concerning access to justice’.44 
Thus the Constitutional Treaty would have gone some way to en-
trenching the constitutional functions of the Court, and, in tandem with 
the consequences of the various changes to introduced by the Nice Trea-
ty,45 could be expected to contribute to an increasing specialisation of 
the Court’s constitutional role.46 At same time, the process of negotiating 
the Constitutional Treaty and formalising the Court’s constitutionalised 
doctrines challenged its constitutional rhetoric. Such damage was done 
regardless of whether ratifi cation ultimately took place. 
3: The Court under the Reform Treaty
Of course, ratifi cation by all Member States was not possible. Whilst 
a majority successfully completed the ratifi cation process, the ‘no’ votes 
in the Netherlands and France halted the process and led to two-year 
‘period of refl ection’. In June 2007, the Heads of State and Government, 
meeting as the European Council, agreed on a way forward that would see 
reform of the existing Treaties, providing for the maintenance of many of 
the institutional innovations contained in the Constitutional Treaty, but 
which would see some of the more controversial elements removed. The 
European Council agreed on a mandate47 to form the basis and frame-
work for negotiations in an Intergovernmental Conference, commencing 
in July 2007. That a way out of the constitutional impasse could be found 
44  P Craig, ‘What Constitution does Europe Need? The House that Giscard Built: Consti-
tutional Rooms with a View’ (2003) The Federal Trust Constitutional Online Paper Series 
No 26/03 <http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/26_03.pdf> accessed 22 July 
2007. 
45  Such as the potential for the Court of First Instance (which would have been renamed 
the ‘General Court’ under the Constitutional Treaty) taking on jurisdiction for Article 234 
EC references.
46  For discussions of the possibility of reserving an exclusive constitutional jurisdiction to 
the European Court of Justice, see eg B Vesterdorf, ‘A Constitutional Court for the EU?’ 
(2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 607.
47  Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions (Brussels, 23 June 2007) 
11177/07 CONCL 2. For the fi rst draft of the Reform Treaty, see CIG 1/07 (Brus-
sels, 23 July 2007); see also http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.
asp?id=1297&lang=en. 
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is in many respects down to Germany’s President Angela Merkel’s careful 
diplomacy. With Germany’s six-month Presidency of the European Coun-
cil coming to an end, Portugal has taken over the task of managing the 
move to the adoption of a formal Reform Treaty document. The proposed 
time scale is ambitious. When presenting its Presidency Programme, Por-
tugal’s Prime Minister Socrates stated a commitment to having agree-
ment on the text of the Treaty by the middle of October 2007. 
According to the IGC Mandate, ‘[t]he constitutional concept, which 
consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single 
text called “Constitution” is abandoned’.48 The envisaged Reform Treaty 
will retain the current two-Treaty approach, bringing amendments to 
both the Treaty on European Union, and to the EC Treaty, which will 
be renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The 
language of constitutionalism is rejected, as are those aspects from the 
Constitutional Treaty perceived by some as redolent of statism: the mot-
to, fl ag and anthem, and the nomenclature of ‘Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs’, now renamed the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy’. Amendments to the form and functioning 
of the institutions, necessary to ensure a more effective operation of an 
ever-expanding Union are, by and large maintained,49 as are the exten-
sions to the Court’s jurisdiction over the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. The concern with competences and their proper exercise is ap-
parent. A Declaration is proposed which reinforces the principle of con-
ferral, and which additionally acknowledges for the fi rst time that the 
Member State governments, through Treaty revision may both increase 
and reduce competences conferred by them on the Union. 
The provision on the primacy of Union law will not appear in the 
main text of the Treaties, though a Declaration is proposed, the text of 
which will provide that ‘[t]he Conference recalls that, in accordance with 
the well-settled case law of the EU Court of Justice, the Treaties and the 
law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over 
the law of the Member States, under the conditions laid down by the 
said case-law’. As with the formulation contained in the Constitutional 
Treaty, there is no explicit mention of the supremacy of EU law over na-
tional constitutions. The reference to the primacy of the law of the Treaties 
meanwhile does suggest that the supremacy principle should not be seen 
as limited to the law of the former community pillar but extends across 
the actions of the Union. 
48  Presidency Conclusions ANNEX 1 [1].
49  Although concessions to certain States appear necessary on the introduction of new 
voting rules in Council. 
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A more signifi cant omission from the main body of the Treaties is 
that of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, though the envisaged re-
formed TEU will cross-reference it, and will state that it will have legally 
binding force, and the same legal value as the Treaties. The Charter is to 
be re-enacted by the institutions, and published in the Offi cial Journal. 
However, a set of declarations and protocols seek to limit the impact of 
the Charter, and the use which can be made of it by the Court. The UK 
government’s position on the legal status of the Charter has hardened 
considerably since its agreement to the Constitutional Treaty. Under a 
proposed Protocol, the UK seeks to limit the legal effects of the Charter. 
The Protocol provides: 
Article 1
1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, 
or any court or tribunal of the United Kingdom, to fi nd that the 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of 
the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and principles that it reaffi rms.
2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in…the 
Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom 
except in so far as the United Kingdom has provided for such rights 
in its national law’.
It has been reported that the UK government became particularly 
concerned with the potential for the Charter, and its interpretation by 
the Court, to challenge national labour law, requiring extensions to the 
rights available at national level. This position was no doubt sharpened 
following recent Advocates Generals’ opinions which consider the right to 
strike, arising in the context of attempts to assure respect for employment 
terms and conditions by service providers making use of the free move-
ment of services provisions.50 Signifi cantly, Advocate General Maduro in 
his opinion recognised the rights to associate and take collective action 
as being of ‘a fundamental character within the Community legal order, 
as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reaffi rms’.51 
At the June Summit, two other States, Poland and Ireland, reserved their 
right to join this Protocol. In addition, Poland also entered a unilateral 
declaration, to the effect that the Charter ‘does not affect in any way the 
right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of public morality, family 
50  Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation 
and the Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti (23 May 2007); 
and Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnad-
sarbetareförbundet and others (23 May 2007).
51  Viking Line (n 50) para 60. 
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law as well as the protection of human dignity and the respect for human 
physical and moral integrity’. 
It will remain to be seen how successful such moves are in restrict-
ing the Court in its use of the Charter and the development of its human 
rights jurisprudence. Certainly, there is nothing legally to stand in the 
way of the Court pursuing fundamental rights protection and interpreta-
tion through the route of general principles, rather than explicitly under 
the Charter. Indeed, save in a small number of exceptional cases, and de-
spite invitations from Advocates General,52 litigants, and others present-
ing their observations, the Court has been careful to restrict its reliance 
on the Charter in its jurisprudence to date,53 preferring instead to locate 
exclusively the source of fundamental rights in the EU order as general 
principles drawn from the common constitutional traditions of the Mem-
ber States, and sources such as the European Convention of Human 
Rights. This has recently been seen in respect of the Court’s recognition 
of a general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, in 
Mangold,54 a case with consequences not simply for national labour law, 
but signifi cant also in that the Court held that the principle of consistent 
interpretation of national legislation with EU law would apply before the 
transposition period of relevant directive had passed. 
4: The End of Judicial Constitutionalisation?
According to an accepted view of the integration process, during peri-
ods in the Union’s history when the political dimension has been stalled, 
the European Court had stepped in, delivering judgments which have 
further developed - indeed federalised- the legal order, and maintained 
the integrative momentum. Could we expect the Court do so again dur-
ing the current period of constitutional limbo and political uncertainty? 
It could be suggested that the Court may be increasingly wary of taking 
such a lead, given the complicated political environment that it oper-
ates within, the lessons learnt from the past that its constitutionalised 
doctrines do not always gain unqualifi ed support and acceptance, and 
with new levels of opposition from within some of the new Member State 
52  Sometimes particularly forcibly: in his opinion in Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de 
Wereld v Leden van de Ministerrad (3 May 2007), for example, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
argued that ‘the Court must break its silence and recognise the authority of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as an interpretative tool at the forefront of the protection of the funda-
mental rights which are part of the heritage of the Member States’ (para 79).
53  Including it as an additional source confi rming the status of fundamental rights in Case 
C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-576; Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld 
v Leden van de Ministerrad (3 May 2007); Case C-432/05 Unibet Ltd v Justititekanslern 
(13 March 2007).
54  Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
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orders. On one level, recent activities of the Court would tend to sup-
port the fi rst view. As Mangold demonstrates, during the period of formal 
constitutional uncertainty, the Court has continued to hand down judg-
ments of constitutional signifi cance. A particularly notable contribution 
over recent years has been the Court’s rulings which have seen it ex-
tend principles developed in the Community pillar across the three pillar 
structure, moving some way towards bringing a unifying coherence to the 
fragmented legal orders.
At issue in Pupino55 was the interpretation of national, Italian law on 
procedural protections offered to victims in criminal trials. Under nation-
al law, a special regime for the giving of evidence was available to alleged 
child sex abuse victims, enabling them to give evidence away from the 
Court. Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA56 on the standing of 
victims in criminal proceedings however provides that States should en-
sure special treatment is made available for all victims who are ‘particu-
larly vulnerable’. The victims in the national criminal trial - all children 
- had allegedly been abused by a school teacher, but not sexually. Could 
they nonetheless take advantage of the provisions in the Framework De-
cision when giving their evidence? Under Article 34(2)(b) TEU, Frame-
work Decisions are defi ned as being ‘binding upon the Member States as 
to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of forms and methods’. This article further explicitly provides that 
these measures ‘shall not entail direct effect’. As such, the national law 
could not simply be substituted by the EU provision. Nonetheless, and in 
opposition to some of the views presented by Member States in the case, 
the Court of Justice considered it possible to read across the principle 
of indirect effect, or consistent interpretation, from the EC order into the 
Police and Judicial Co-operation pillar. Identifying the signifi cant simi-
larities between directives and framework decisions, and overcoming the 
formal absence of an Article 10 EC duty of loyal cooperation in the TEU 
provisions, the Court reasoned that:
It would be diffi cult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the 
principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member 
States take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure fulfi lment of their obligations under European Union law, 
were not also binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.57 
55  Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
56  [2001] OJ L82/1.
57  Pupino (n 55) para 42.
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Meanwhile, in Dell’Orto,58 the Court was presented with a request for 
a preliminary ruling from an Italian court, again on the scope of Frame-
work Decision 2001/220/JHA, this time on whether legal, as well as nat-
ural persons are covered by its terms when they are the victims of alleged 
crimes. Rather than being brought under Article 35 TEU, which provides 
the basis for preliminary rulings under the third pillar, the referring court 
had used the Article 234 EC procedure. However, according to the Court, 
which appeared to draw interpretative strength from the unifying dimen-
sions of its Pupino judgment,
the fact that the order for reference does not mention Article 35 EU, 
but refers to Article 234 EC, cannot of itself make the reference for 
preliminary ruling inadmissible. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
fact that the Treaty on European Union neither expressly nor by 
implication lays down the form in which the national court must 
present its reference for a preliminary ruling.59 
Finally, in Gestoras Pro Amnistìa, 60 the Court was asked to fi ll the 
gaps in the legal order to enable an action in damages to be brought 
by litigants affected by EU measures adopted outside the Community 
framework. The Basque group Gestoras Pro Amnistìa had, it alleged, 
been wrongly identifi ed as a terrorist group in an annex to a Council 
Common Position on the application of certain measures to combat ter-
rorism,61 and had subsequently suffered damage through the freezing of 
its assets, for which it sought redress. The Common Position had been 
adopted jointly on the CFSP basis of Article 15 TEU and Article 34 TEU, 
the Police and Judicial Co-operation pillar. A Council declaration at the 
time of the adoption of the Common Position provided that in the event 
of any error in respect to those on the list, the injured party had the right 
to seek judicial redress. An action in damages before the CFI had been 
thrown out,62 and indeed, the Court of Justice agreed that no action in 
damages could stand - Article 35 TEU did not grant it jurisdiction to hear 
actions in damages. However, Article 35 TEU also excludes jurisdiction 
of the Court over common positions. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that 
this exclusion was based on the assumption that common positions were 
without binding legal effects for third parties. Where this assumption was 
wrong, and the measure had binding legal effects, it could come before 
58  Case 467/05 Dell’Orto (28 June 2007).
59  Ibid para 36.
60  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistìa and others v Council (27 February 2007).
61  2001/931/CFSP [2001] OJ L344/1.
62  Case T-333/02 Gestoras Pro Amnistìa and others v Council, Order of 7 June 2004 [2004] 
OJ C228/40. 
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the Court, regardless of its nomenclature. The Court relied on case law 
from the Community pillar to make this point:
The right to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling 
must therefore exist in respect of all measures adopted by the Coun-
cil, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal 
effects in relation to third parties (see, by analogy, Case 22/70 Com-
mission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paragraphs 38 to 42, and 
Case C-57/95 France v Commission [1997] ECR I-1627, paragraph 
7 et seq.).63 
Equally, despite their apparent exclusion from Article 35(6) TEU, 
common positions with legal effects could be subject to action in annul-
ments brought by the Commission or by the Member States. 
This case law may thus present a view of the Court taking its fi rst 
steps towards unifying the legal orders of the fragmented pillars around 
a Community legal logic, and they would seem to accord with a view of 
the Court as constitutional hero, pushing forward the integration process 
whilst it is stalled through other routes. As Fletcher reports for example, 
‘as the EU faces yet another political crisis following the failure of the 
constitutional treaty, the European Court of Justice has boldly stepped 
in to fl ex its transformative muscles once again’.64 Certainly, a legal nar-
rative could continue to be employed that reifi es the role of the Court, 
that accords a central role to it in pushing forward constitutionalisation. 
And an argument could be advanced that there was a certain inevitability 
to these decisions, that the law has its own path dependent logic, in that 
earlier decisions, and the bases on which they were taken have conse-
quences which fl owed inexorably to these rulings, and beyond. 
However, I would suggest that we need to be cautious about accept-
ing this view of an inherently integrative legal order. Certainly, it cannot 
be ignored that the Court operates as a legal institution, and as such, 
reasoning by analogy is recognised as an appropriate interpretative ap-
proach, and the doctrine of precedence is an important feature, but to 
simply accept that there is a certain inevitability to these judgments, and 
any continued constitutionalisation of the other pillars, would be to write 
out all sense of agency in the legal order. On any one point, the Court 
will be faced with a range of legally arguable views, all presented as the 
natural consequences of the previous case law, such is the nature of le-
gal argumentation. These views may be internal to the judicial process 
itself, as presented by Advocates General, by the parties to the case, and 
63  Gestoras Pro Amnistìa para 53.
64  M Fletcher, ‘Extending “Indirect Effect” to the Third Pillar: The Signifi cance of Pupino’ 
(2005) EL Rev 862, 877.
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by those providing observations. The perspectives of the Commission’s 
Legal Service presented as observations may prove a valuable resource 
(the results in Mangold and Pupino both appear to accord with the ap-
proach favoured by the Commission, for example), and the composition 
of the Court may also be signifi cant. The Court will also be participat-
ing in a wider, iterative learning process, drawing on signals from other 
institutions and national courts to determine what may be considered 
appropriate and legitimate, through both internal and external perspec-
tives. Such an explanation may for example be seen as one of the causes 
of the Court’s continued refusal to accord horizontal direct effects to di-
rectives. Equally, it may learn that national court support is not whole-
hearted for its reading across of Community pillar norms and principles 
into other areas,65 and should wait for formal developments to take place 
through Member State reform of the Treaty framework. There is much to 
be said of Ross’s argument that ‘effectiveness is emerging as the driver 
of constitutional evolution’:66 its language and logic lies explicitly within 
many of these cases, indeed, it appears as something of a justifi catory 
‘institutional mantra’,67 however, there are clear limits to what the Court 
recognises it can achieve in the name of effectiveness. 
Conclusion
Amongst its many functions, the Court has a signifi cant role in con-
ducting constitutional review, a role which extends across the pillars of 
the EU. It reviews the constitutionality of EU measures, and holds the 
Member States to account for their respect for EU law, both directly, un-
der actions brought according to the 226-228 EC enforcement procedure, 
and indirectly, through Article 234 EC. The Court’s powers are strongly 
developed in respect to Community law, and it is currently taking steps 
to develop its assigned role in relation to measures currently under the 
third pillar. Thus, it is generally accepted that the Court has constitu-
tionalised the EC Treaty, and is now undertaking a comparable project in 
relation to elements of the EU Treaty. In this article, it has been argued 
that to the extent that constitutionalisation has been undertaken by the 
65   See, for example, the judgment of the German Constitutional Court in the review of the 
constitutionality of the national implementation of the European Arrest Warrant regime, 
2 BvR 2236/04, which emphasises the ‘public international law’ status of the third pillar, 
and leaves an ‘eloquent silence’ on the issue of its interpretative obligations under Pupino; 
H Satzger and T Pohl, ‘The German Constitutional Court and the European Arrest Warrant: 
Cryptic Signals from Karlsruhe’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 686, 
695. See also J Komarek, ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: 
In Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles”’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 9.
66  M Ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European Legal Order(s): Beyond Supremacy to Constitu-
tional Proportionality’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 476.
67  Ibid 480.
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Court, it has done so, and could continue to do so only with the support 
of a range of legal and political actors. The constitutionalised Treaty ac-
cording to the Court does not necessarily have the same qualities when 
viewed from the perspective of the Member State. It has questioned the 
assumption of an inherently integrative logic questioned, and this ap-
pears more pertinent today, with the proposed Reform Treaty containing 
provisions which would seem to act as a potential brake on the assumed 
drive to ‘ever closer union’ - such as the acknowledgement that compe-
tences may be handed back to Member States, and States may withdraw 
from the Union. This feature is one of many aspects of the complex con-
text within which the Court must operate. In the fi nal analysis, we could 
broadly expect the Court, charged with task of ensuring law is observed, 
to seek to take such steps as a necessary to promote the effectiveness of 
the legal order, within the limits of the Treaty, and to the extent that it 
can rely on a suffi cient basis of support for its interpretations of the law. 
Reliance on an assumed respect for, and acceptance of, legal rulings sim-
ply because they have the quality of law may prove misplaced.
